Rationales and Origins of Residual State Property

Introduction
In 1989 the former Czechoslovakia had one of the smallest private sectors in the communist world, employing only about 1.2% of the labor force and producing a negligible fraction of the national output. Often cited as one of the major success stories of the transition in Eastern Europe, the Czech privatization program resulted in almost 75% of productive capacity being transferred to the private sector by the first quarter of 1995 after the mass privatization program was completed (for preceding overview see Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess (1994) and Blanchard et al. (1991) ). This is comprehensively captured by Table 1.1. Kočenda (1998) Privatization in the Czech Republic was carried out under three programs: restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale (or mass) privatization. This comprehensive privatization program resulted in a remarkably high share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being eventually produced by the private sector. Prior to the January 1, 1993 split of the former Czechoslovakia, privatization was carried out jointly in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Generally, however, data is available for each republic independently and it makes an analysis easier to do. For other references related to macroeconomic aspects of privatization see Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Earle (1994) and Kotrba (1995) among others. As a summary of the official macroeconomic outcome of the privatization process Table 1 .2 compares the role of the private sector as a percentage share of the GDP in various Central European countries from 1990 to 1997. Source: IMF, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) 
Privatization Methods
The Czech government pursued three major programs of privatization: property restitutions, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization. The first two started in 1990 and were most important during the early years of transition.
Restitution restored assets to those from whom they had been nationalized by the communist regime after 1948. Estimates of the amount of property involved in restitution are sketchy since implementation was carried out by direct negotiation between current and former owners. There have been at least 200,000 claims for agricultural land. In addition, about 70,000 apartment buildings have been returned to their former owners. For our purposes, the most important feature of the restitution program is that owners of industrial property incorporated into larger enterprises (or expanded by new investment since nationalization) were entitled to receive a share of the enterprise when it was privatized. In addition, they could purchase an additional part of the enterprise on preferential terms (usually at book value and without having to compete with other potential buyers).
Small-scale privatization dealt primarily with small economic units such as shops, restaurants or smaller industrial enterprises that were sold at public auction. Bidding was restricted to Czech citizens or corporations formed by such citizens. Buyers were forbidden from transferring property to foreigners. By the end of 1992, over 22,000
units with a total sale price of about $1 billion had been privatized through smallscale privatization. At least additional 10,000 units were approved for later sale.
Although there was no explicit limitation on the size of property that could be auctioned in small-scale privatization, the program focused on small businesses engaged primarily in retail trade. By the end of 1993, when the program was officially terminated, 30.4 billions crowns worth of property had been sold to private owners.
Large (Mass) Privatization
By far the most important privatization program in the Czech Republic was largescale privatization. This process began in the spring of 1991. Enterprises not privatized through restitution or small-scale privatization were divided into four groups:
-firms to be privatized in the first and second waves of large-scale privatization, -firms to be privatized later (after five years), and -firms to be liquidated.
It is evident that the first two categories of firms form the core companies where the state kept its share. At the beginning it was the Ministry of Privatization that executed the process. Later on, the Fund of National Property (FNP) was established as a state institution that was entitled with legal power to exercise property rights over the companies that were fully or partially owned by the state.
Large-scale privatization allowed combinations of several privatization techniques:
small businesses were typically auctioned or sold in tender; medium businesses were sold in tender or to a predetermined buyer (direct sales). The largest firms were transformed into joint stock companies, the shares of which were distributed within voucher privatization (almost one half of the total number of all shares of all joint stock companies was privatized), sold for cash or transferred for free to municipalities. Municipalities also benefited from transfers of property, namely unused land within their territory.
As mentioned earlier, large-scale privatization was launched in 1991. Its evolution in nominal monetary units is presented in Table 1 .3. Source: Ministry of Finance, Hanousek and Kočenda (1998) Over 2,400 firms in the Czech Republic (about half of all firms eligible for largescale privatization) were assigned to the first wave, which began in June 1991. For each firm assigned to the first wave, the firm's management (under the supervision of its founding or supervising ministry) had to submit a proposal by October 31, 1991 for how the firm would be privatized. This proposal could involve one or more methods of privatization, including direct sale to a domestic or foreign buyer, public auction, public tender offer, unpaid transfer to a municipality or other agent, transfer to workers, or participation in the voucher scheme. Shares not allocated to the voucher scheme could be sold directly to a chosen buyer or offered to the general public on the securities market. In addition to indicating the preferred method(s) of privatization, each firm's plan had to present basic financial and operational information, including employment, wages, capital, sales, costs, profit or loss and foreign trade during the period 1989-1991.
It was possible for anyone other than the firm management to submit a competing privatization plan for all or part of each enterprise. All told, the 2,404 enterprises involved in the first wave elicited 11,349 projects, an average of 4.72 projects per firm. The founding ministry and the Ministry of Privatization decided among the competing projects, except in the case of a sale to a foreign buyer, which had to be approved by the government of the respective republic. Since a project could be for only part of a firm, the total number of approved projects was about 1.5 times the number of firms privatized. As might be expected, proposals from the management of firms were most likely to be approved. Management projects accounted for between 20 and 25 percent of all proposals, but over half of those were approved. Proposals to purchase all or part of a firm were the second most commonly approved group.
Although it may appear that the allocation of shares to the voucher scheme resulted from proposals generated "from the bottom," in fact the privatization authorities had rough goals regarding how much property they wanted to be included in the voucher program and indicated how the vouchers would be finally allocated. In the end, 988 firms out of the 2,404 firms in the first wave had some or all of their shares allocated to the voucher program. The vast majority of these firms distributed over half of their net worth through vouchers, with an average of 61.4% of capital being placed in the voucher scheme. The second largest share (23.3%) was retained by the Fund for National Property. Much of this share either has already been or will eventually be sold in the equity market. 
Property
The Investment Privatization Funds formed a popular form of how the citizens allocated their points from the large privatization. For these points the funds acquired shares in numerous companies, where the state also kept its share. At the same moment it has to be noted that a number of these funds was formed by financial institution where the state has kept its large share. Thus the funds involuntarily became to a certain extent institutional managers of the residual state property. The next part helps to understand the situation.
All Czech citizens over the age of 18 who resided in the Czech or Slovak Republics could participate in the voucher process. Each participant could purchase a book of 1,000 voucher points for a fee of Kcs 1,000 (a little over one week's wage for the average worker in 1992). Before the bidding process started, each voucher holder had the option of assigning all or part of his points to one or more Investment Privatization Fund (IPF). These IPFs had to provide basic information regarding their ownership and investment strategy. In addition, information regarding profitability, sales, growth rates, and extent of proposed foreign involvement for each firm was provided in a booklet available to all voucher holders. Anyone who brought a diskette to the privatization offices could obtain this information in a database designed to make analyses easy. A great number of citizens opted to put their stakes into the funds. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the most important fund groups that managed to gain more than 2% market-share and their relative position on the market. Kočenda (1998) The first wave of voucher privatization started slowly. During the first two months citizens could buy voucher coupons, only a few hundred thousand did so. By January of 1992, official estimates were that only about 20% of eligible participants would purchase books before the official deadline at the end of February. However, in the next two months demand soared, largely in response to advertisements by several of the IPFs guaranteeing returns of 1,000% in one year. 3 In the end, 75% of those eligible to participate did so. About 72% of the voucher points were placed for bidding with one of the 264 IPFs in the Czech Republic, while 28% were retained by individuals.
There was substantial concentration among the IPFs, with over 56% of the points given to the funds being controlled by the thirteen largest funds.
Residual State Property
Despite the massive scale of the voucher privatization, there still remains a substantial number of companies where the state has been involved. From Table 1 .4
we know that 1849 companies of a book value of 367.5 billions entered both waves of voucher privatization. In 1998 the state has kept its involvement in 369 companies with the overall book value of more than 440 billions crowns. The book value of the state share in these companies amounted to almost 177 billions crowns. A great number of these companies was "privatized" through voucher privatization but the state did not privatize them entirely.
The As revealed by Figure 2 .2, when the relative book value of enterprises in each category is considered, it seriously undermines the former observation about the influence of the state. The relative book value of those enterprises which entirely belong to FNP is no more than 4% and a relative number of these is about 8%.
However, the relative book value of all enterprises where the FNP has a share over 50% reaches spectacular 41%. It has to be noted that the control over 41% of companies is effected solely through the voting rights associated with the number of shares above 50%. Thus, even though the state literally controls only seemingly unimportant part of Czech companies, as far as number of firms is concerned, the book value of this part is no longer unimportant. One cannot but to conclude that, despite the voucher privatization, the state sustained its influence over the significant part of the Czech economy.
Residual Cross-ownership
We already noted that the state control is associated with the ownership in companies and banks that may involve a certain degree of cross-ownership. To understand the problem, let us consider the following example: 40% of shares of company A is owned by company B, while the rest is the property of company C.
Company C is, however, owned from 60% by company B. Clearly, the real influence of company B over company A is much bigger than the primary ownership indicates.
The question of how to evaluate the extent of such influence that stems from crossownership is not easy to address. Turnovec (1999) suggested new methodological approach, which can provide some insight in the real property rights in an enterprise with cross-ownership involvement. The matrix algebra based technique was designed to unveil the indirect ownership that is usually hidden behind the scene, on which the 'actors'-seemingly unrelated owners-perform. In the following section we briefly outline the matrix-algebra technique proposed by Turnovec (1999) , and present the results by applying the methodology on the case of the major Czech banks.
Suppose there is m primary owners and n secondary owners. Primary owners can be citizens, the state, municipalities, etc. and they can own, but cannot be owned.
Secondary owners are companies that can be owned. Let Having defined the methodology for examining the indirect ownership, we present some results of its application in the Czech banking sector. The following Table 2.3 shows how the position of the Fund of National Property in the five leading banks changes, when one considers the "higher degree" ownership. 4 Not only the percentage share increases but in one case exceeds the 50% threshold that is so important in case of voting (KB). In other case (CSOB) no change occurs simply because the rest of the shares is already owned also by the state, however, through other legal bodies that are not considered by the above technique. We did not include the other case where no change occurred (IPB) due to the fact that this bank (IPB) was in 1997 fully privatized through the sale to a foreign strategic investor. Such "real" privatization is subject of a section 4.2. Despite the fact that the aggregate book value of these three categories, however, as documented by Figure 3 .2, sums up to the incredible 72%. 
Ownership Environment of the IPFs and Management Regulations
Large-scale privatization brought companies out of direct state ownership, but left them without proper management. This was due to the fact that shares in legally and newly created companies belonged to the state, investment funds or banks, or were spread among numerous small shareholders. The interest of investment funds in increasing the net asset value of the shares on one side and the lack of power of small shareholders on the other created an extremely soft-management environment. Such a situation was not a suitable environment for the active management and necessary restructuralization of non-competitive industries.
Over time, however, the situation changed considerably. The investment funds started to trim their portfolios to weed out non-productive companies or to create positions for eventual transformation into holding companies. Sales for the sake of sheer profit were also not uncommon. Of particular importance is that such a process enabled firms to affect a corporate governance since the majority shareholders in each company started to transform their firms while pursuing active management. Despite the fact that the issue of corporate governance was addressed by Aghion, Blanchard, and Carlin (1994) , and Coffee (1996) , among others, literature on the corporate governance of companies in transition economies is still insufficient.
IPFs were subject to a number of regulations that made them resemble closed-end mutual funds in the West. Technically, funds for the first wave of voucher privatization were organized as "Legally Independent Joint Stock Companies" since the law that allowed more conventional mutual funds (including open-ended funds) did not come into effect until after the deadline for registering funds for the first round. Funds had to be approved by the Ministry of Privatization and had to have at least Kcs 1 million in initial capital. The structure of Joint Stock Companies that emerged out of privatization is conveniently presented in Table 3 .1. For a fund to be approved, the founder had to submit a plan including the contract between the founder of the fund and the fund itself (which was required to be a separate legal entity). This plan was required to document: 1) the management conditions of the fund, 2) the number and qualifications of the administrators of the fund, 3) information regarding the board of directors and supervisory board of the fund, and 4) the fund's investment policy regarding risk taking and sector specialization.
Czech corporate governance is a melding of American and German models. As we mentioned earlier in section 3.1 each firm has two governing boards, a Board of Directors and a Supervisory Board. The Board of Directors is elected by the general shareholders to actively manage the company. The Supervisory Board is elected 30% by employees and 70% by shareholders. It tends to have limited powers, best characterized as the ability to harass the Board of Directors.
Compensation to a fund's founder (operator) for managing the fund was limited to 2% of the nominal value of shares gained through voucher privatization plus up to 3% of assets and 20% of the fund's profits each year following privatization. Government officials were excluded from serving on the board of an IPF. Each IPF could not invest more than 10% of its points in a single company nor obtain more than 20% of any company.
Initially related funds from a single founder could own no more than 40% of a firm.
This was later reduced to 20%. Funds could, in fact, exceed this limit if they agreed to sell the excess within six months of the opening of trading in the firm on the Prague Stock Exchange. In addition, mergers among funds could mean that this limit was violated and firms would have to sell shares to come into compliance.
Since the most common situation was for the founder of a fund to be an already established financial institution, regulations also forbade funds founded by financial institutions from purchasing shares in financial institutions. The potential for financial concentration is evident from the fact that the six large financial institutions included in the first wave of voucher privatization controlled 5 out of the 6 largest groups of IPFs. Together these six financial institutions obtained the right to bid over 36% of all the points in the first wave of voucher privatization. Such outcome was naturally translated into an ownership structure.
Residual Privatization
Direct State Share
Apart from the residual state property that is in reality managed by privatization funds the state still keeps important share in numerous joint stock companies. As a summary Table 4 .1 shows in a brief but highly illustrative way current situation regarding direct involvement of the state in the companies that are contained in the portfolio of the FNP. It is evident that the state still owns an enormous share of the economy through its ownership involvement in various companies. This fact should be contrasted especially with the number of companies that entered voucher privatization as well as with the scope of privatization in general. The state currently owns shares in 369 companies and this portion amounts to almost 155 billions crowns. The book value of these companies is next to three times greater though. The most valuable portion of assets falls into the category of 20 companies where the state holds more that half but less that three quarter share. Most of these 20 companies is considered as strategic ones and they account for more that a third of total book value of the companies in question. In view of the facts it seems legitimate to question the official success of the voucher privatization.
Nevertheless, the state felt its obligation to privatize further. The next two sections describe a case of bank privatization and the outline of future prospects to privatize the rest of the residual state property.
A Case of a Bank Privatization: Sale to a Foreign Investor
During the years following the formal end of the mass privatization nothing much changed as for the real privatization since the state has kept massive share in the voucher-privatized companies. The intention to privatize further has materialized in several cases though. As a case study we present the description of the privatization of the bank that has belonged to so called "Big Four" among the banks in the Czech republic.
The Czech government approved the plan of the privatization of the Investment and Post Bank (IPB) on November 27, 1996. The privatization of this bank was to be arranged through the sale of shares owed by the FNP (31.5%) and Czech Post (4.45%) to a strategic foreign investor. Set of criteria for a choice of a foreign partner was announced subsequently and renowned privatization advisory company, Salomon
Brothers, was appointed to manage the tender. Fourteen candidates took part in the tender. Out of these candidates, four advanced to the second stage. The companies that were found eligible to bid were: Nomura, ING Bank, ABN AMRO, and Deutsche
Bank. The Nomura came out as the most suitable candidate.
On July 23, 1997 the government of the Czech republic issued a decree about the sale of the state share in the IPB to the Nomura Europe PCL. In order to precise the sale price, an audit of the IPB was commenced. On March 8, 1998 the FNP and the Nomura Europe PCL signed the contract about the sale. Several binding conditions formed a part of the contract. Both parties involved agreed upon the price that amounted to nearly 3 billions of Czech crowns. One major condition was that Nomura would increase the total equity of the IPB by 6 billions crowns, and would be an exclusive issuer of this increase. Besides that, the Nomura had to commit itself to being an important issuer of the emission of bonds that took place on April 16, 1998.
During the extraordinary general assembly of shareholders that took place on March 8, 1998 the Nomura promised to the other shareholders of the IPB, that it would not take part in the second increase in the bank's equity, so that the other shareholders could renew their positions. The second increase occurred in September 1998 without Nomura's participation, and its volume reached 1.701 billions of crowns. As for the corporate structure it has to be mentioned that at the general assembly in March 1998 a major change in the bank's statutory bodies occurred to reflect new ownership division. The governance structure of the bank was further altered later in 1998.
At the beginning of 1998 the IPB substantially increased its reserves and loan-loss provisions which has resulted in the total loss of 11 million crowns. Such an operation was to reflect troubled financial situation of the bank that reflected state of affaire within the Czech financial sector. The loss was naturally mirrored in the bank's books and the IPB covered it mainly with an aid of reserve funds. Having taken the steps described, the bank was ready to increase its efficiency. It has set an ambitious goal for 1998 in a form of a net profit around 2 millions crowns. It is obvious that only the future will show the complete picture about the privatization of the IPB. So far the bank did reasonably well. In any event its privatization was until now the only completed privatization of its kind within Czech banking sector.
Privatization Schedule
Political crisis at the end of 1997 resulted in a dissolution of the government by the president who appointed new government to consolidate state affairs. Selection of the cabinet was made with professional merits rather than political affiliation on mind.
This government received a time-limited mandate until the elections that were held in July 1998. The government intended to privatize the share of state property first in the so-called strategic companies. In order to do so, the privatization schedule was set up. Table 4 .2 list all important companies the government wanted to fully privatize in the nearest future. These companies are divided in to three categories that correspond to the time phase of their privatization. The first category contains companies that were selected to be privatized immediately and the strategic investor was to be selected entirely throughout the public auction. Firms operating in the mining industry dominate this section. The second category contains companies that would be prepared for privatization but the details would be clarified later. Three out of four largest banks belong to this cohort and steps towards their privatization were already being taken. Companies falling in to the third category were subject to further objectives of the government but the objectives were not clearly specified.
General elections held in July 1998 were won by the Social Democratic Party that after lengthy deliberation formed a majority government and signed so called "opposition agreement" with its political competitor, Civic Democratic Party, to avoid eventual clashes of power. The political change brought also the different perspective towards the blueprint of residual state property privatization. The government approved only a privatization framework without outlining details concerning privatization of different strategic companies. When compared to the time schedule of the consolidation government (Table 4 .2) it is evident that the privatization of strategic companies tends to be delayed within the range from one to three years. In certain cases the timing proposal is entirely missing. The banks are the only exception because the government wants to privatize them as quickly as possible.
Such a strategy might be contra-productive, though. Since many of the strategic manufacturing companies are heavily indebted with the strategic banks, the privatization of both categories of firms should be effected more or less simultaneously.
Further, the privatization in energy sector was put on hold. Privatization schedule assumes that sales of energetic distribution networks will take place from 2000 to 2002. However, decision regarding further direction of privatization of the monopoly electricity producer (ČEZ) will wait till 2002. According to arguments in Kočenda and Čábelka (1999) such an approach might result in inept consequences.
As for the natural gas processing and distributing companies, the government intends to acquire back various portions of shares so that the state would again keep majority in such companies. Eventual sales would then be effected from a majority owner position. Relatively quick sales are expected in cases of one oil processing company and two coal mining companies where the state still holds sheer majority.
Concluding Remarks
Privatization in the Czech Republic was carried out under three programs: restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale (or mass) privatization. The Czech government pursued three major programs of privatization: property restitutions, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization. Restitution restored assets to those from whom they had been nationalized by the communist regime after 1948.
Small-scale privatization dealt primarily with small economic units such as shops, restaurants or smaller industrial enterprises that were sold at public auction.
By far the most important privatization program in the Czech Republic was largescale privatization that began in the spring of 1991. Large-scale privatization allowed combinations of several privatization techniques: small businesses were typically auctioned or sold in tender; medium businesses were sold in tender or to a predetermined buyer (direct sales). The largest firms were transformed into joint stock companies, the shares of which were distributed within voucher privatization (almost one half of the total number of all shares of all joint stock companies was privatized), sold for cash or transferred for free to municipalities.
This comprehensive privatization program resulted in a remarkably high share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being eventually produced by the private sector. Often cited as one of the major success stories of the transition in Eastern Europe, the Czech privatization program resulted in almost 75% of productive capacity being transferred to the private sector by the first quarter of 1995 after the mass privatization program was completed.
The Investment Privatization Funds formed a popular form of how the citizens allocated their points from the large privatization. For these points the funds acquired shares in numerous companies, where the state also kept its share. At the same moment it has to be noted that a number of these funds was formed by financial institution where the state has kept its large share. Thus the funds involuntarily became to a certain extent institutional managers of the residual state property.
Despite the massive scale of the voucher privatization, there still remains a substantial number of companies where the state has been involved. The total number of 1849 companies of a book value of 367.5 billions entered both waves of voucher privatization. In 1998 the state has kept its involvement in 369 companies with the overall book value of more than 440 billions crowns. The book value of the state share in these companies amounted to almost 177 billions crowns. A great number of these companies was "privatized" through voucher privatization but the state did not privatize them entirely.
Even though the state literally controls only seemingly unimportant part of Czech companies, as far as number of firms is concerned, the book value of this part is no longer unimportant. One cannot but to conclude that, despite the voucher privatization, the state sustained its influence over the significant part of the Czech economy.
Translated from absolute numbers we concluded that 76% of the relative book value of the companies influenced by the state represents 332.7 billions crowns out of the total number of 369 companies in the portfolio of the Fund of National Property that amounts to the book value of more than 440 billions of Czech crowns. This means that the state is able to control enormous part of the Czech economy. In view of the facts it seems legitimate to question the official success of the voucher privatization.
The government recently approved a privatization framework without outlining details concerning privatization of different strategic companies. When compared to the time schedule of the previous government it is evident that the privatization of strategic companies tends to be delayed within the range from one to three years. The banks are the only exception because the government wants to privatize them as quickly as possible. Such a strategy might be contra-productive, though. Since many of the strategic manufacturing companies are heavily indebted with the strategic banks, the privatization of both categories of firms should be effected more or less simultaneously. Further, the privatization in energy sector was put on hold.
There exist a clear consensus that further privatization of the residual state property is both necessary and inevitable. We have described the origins and the current situation in this matter. We also outlined the scope and timetable of the official strategy in privatization. The future will tell the results.
